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Authenticity of documents in the electronic era 
by Ivar A. L. Hoel 
Royal School of Library and Information Science, Denmark 
 
Abstract: 
Taking the story of what happened in the Danish Farum local archives as a starting point, the concept of 
document authenticity is explained and discussed. In the age of digital documents the original of a document 
and the copy of it are physically identical and not to be distinguished. Which is the copy, and which is the 
original? Further, and even more important, altering a few bits in the digital document, making it a new 
document as it were, does not imply any traceable physical change in the document as such. This opens up 
to new possibilities fraudulent behaviour as well as to unintended tampering with research results,  pieces of 
historical evidence etc. It makes it necessary to pose the question of how libraries and archives will cope with 
the new situation. Will they able to guarantee the pristine state of the electronic documents that they keep? It 
is argued that the role of libraries and archives as institutions in society that can be relied on, to the extent of 
their guaranteeing the authenticity of documents, must not be underestimated. It is going to be one of their 
important functions in the future. If the problems which that gives rise to are not taken up and solved, the 
societal interest in paying for the upkeep of libraries and archives will diminish. The solutions have to take 
care of organizational, financial and technical problems. Five of the technical possibilites that up to now have 
been developed are discussed. They are: keeping a log-file, reformatting to secure document media, digital 
watermarking, digital time-stamping, and asymmetrical encryption.  
 
 
It is not more than fifteen years ago that copyright was a non-issue for most libraries and other similar 
information providers. Today it recognized to be of vital importance to our future. The intention of my paper 
today is to introduce another issue that in my view is going to achieve the same vital importance in the 
electronic era that we now see the beginnings of. It is the question of document authenticity1. 
 
In other words, I am going to tell you why librarians will have to take an interest in techniques using 
cryptography or steganography. Perhaps you belong to the happy majority of people that never have heard 
the last word before. After having heard my paper you will be just a little better informed when you have to 
decide whether to use it or not. And such decisions will have to be made. 
 
When the concept of authenticity has been discussed in the context of information technology, it has almost 
exclusively been as the authenticity of a person:  who is it that is logging on this server, is he the one he 
claims to be? etc.  What I introduce is a parallel concept of document authenticity. We are going to need it 
just as much. But before going lexicographical and start defining my words, I will tell you a story. 
 
The Farum story, or: what can happen in an archives 
The story is a real life story, and a story that introduces most of the problems related to document 
authenticity2. On January 2nd, 1995 , the telephone in the local history archives of the municipality of Farum, 
(18.000 inhabitants, situated 20 km north of Copenhagen) rang. That was not unusual. What was unusual 
was that it was a Copenhagen company, on behalf of a French company, calling. The French company was 
seeking a patent on something called “enzymatic washing”. As the lady in the phone explained, you cannot 
be granted a patent on something that already has been made known by being published in the press, and 
during the patenting process it had been claimed that in the local, free weekly newspaper “Farum Folkeblad” 
there had been an article on just this topic seven years earlier. This was what the Copenhagen company was 
hired to check, and the question therefore was whether the archives did have a copy  of “Folkebladet” dated 
1988-01-19. They did. And there it was - a paid-for advertisment on enzymatic washing. Did they want a 
copy? They certainly did want a certificated copy, and they would then have it translated and sent to 
Toulouse. The copy having been dispatched, the archives thought that that was the end of the story. But 
there was more to come. 
 
10 days later a fax from Toulouse arrived. The French company wanted a genuine copy of the newspaper, 
not just a photocopy. The archives had to fax back and tell that it would be impossible, as they did only have 
a single copy. Would a copy of the whole newspaper, duly certified, be of interest? It would. The copy having 
been dispatched, the archives thought that that was the end of the story. But there was more to come.  The 
story has just started. 
 
On May 11th 1995 a chartered accountant from Copenhagen called on the phone. He asked: What kind of 
newspaper is this, and does it still exist? It did. Wasn’t it strange that such an advertisment had appeared in 
that newspaper?  Well, the archives people were not patent experts, so they admitted that they had been 
more than a trifle curious over the fact that somebody found it worthwhile to pay for the printing of a technical 
account of L-alpha-amylase. An advertisement for the wonderful suds of some wonderful new household 
detergent would have been more in style with what their readers expected. How had the archives acquired 
this newspaper? This was also accounted for. At last came the main question: Was it possible that somebody 
could have had a fake copy of the newspaper for that particular day printed, and then smuggled it into the 
archives, and stolen the original  away? Well, who can downright deny such a possibility? After all, a good 
patent is worth something, and such a forgery would be much easier than to produce counterfeit money, so… 
 
The very unusual result of such a crucial question was that the local archives made an appeal to the 
inhabitants of Farum, asking them to look into cellars and attics and report back whether anybody had kept a 
copy of a seven-and-a-half year old paper - without the infamous advertisement.  If that were the case, the 
forgery would be demonstrated. This appeal to the public gave a result, and showed that the paper in fact 
was genuine. One of the local readers was employed by a patent office, and she had cut the advertisement  
out and used it for several years in her teaching as a good example of what is known as “patent prophylaxis”. 
The motives for, and the consequences of this habit that  big industrial companies have of laying out 
minefields for each other is, however, not my concern here. I want to draw attention to the stress that all the 
way through was put on the question of authenticity, and raise the questions that will be important in the 
electronic era: What would have been the outcome of the Farum story if the only copy that had been kept of 
the newspaper had been stored electronically? How can we in the electronic  environment guarantee the 
document authenticity? 
 
Document authenticity: a new concept 
Since I am introducing the new concept document authenticity, I had better explain what I am meaning by it. 
As for the word document, the old meaning is not fully applicable to what is normally called electronic 
documents.  The issue of whether we by document denote data files, i.e. objects that are locatable and 
referable to a document carrier, a medium, or whether we by a document also mean screen images of a 
transitory nature, is an important discussion in its own right.3 I will not pursue it here, however, as it will not 
make any great difference for the purposes of this paper4.  
 
The word authenticity denotes of course the quality of being authentic. That word is derived from greek 
authentikós, which again comes from authéntes, meaning perpetrator, doer, author.  According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary the word authentic has four meanings that have a direct bearing on our usage.  It may 
mean  
1)  authoritative  or duly authorized, entitled to obedience or respect,  
2)  being genuine, proceeding from its reputed source or author,   
3)  being reliable, trustworthy, of established credit, as opposed to counterfeit, forged,  
4)  being original, first hand, as opposed to copied.  
 
Remembering  the story just told, it is quite clear that the French company was seeking an authentic 
document in all four meanings of the word. Their questions touched upon all four possible deviations from 
true authenticity. We see that the quality of a document is intimately connected with its authenticity in this full 
meaning: A document that really has the origin and the content it claims to have or is recorded as having, a 
document that is genuine, trustworthy, authoritative, unchanged and thus true in its substance. One of the few 
writers on this subject, and possibly also the first, Mr. Peter S. Graham of Rutgers University Library, has 
stated the problem this way: 
“ The problem may be put in the form of several questions that confront the user of any electronic document  
(whether it is text, hypertext, audio, graphic, numeric or multimedia information): 
 
• How can I be sure that what I am viewing is what I want to see? 
• How do I know that the document I have found is the same one you used and made reference to in your 
footnote? 
• How can I be sure that the document I now use has not been changed since the last time I used it? 
• To put it most generally: How can a reader be sure that the document used is the one intended?” 5  
 
The questions posed are important and apt, but I do, however, have some reservations about the inclusion of 
the concept of personal intention in the last, generalized question. Document authenticity should be able to be 
guaranteed without reference to the needs of a specific person.6 
 
Traditional documents carry their own history 
Peter S. Graham was only speaking of electronic documents. The distinction between traditional and 
electronic documents is an important distinction when it comes to authenticity. The reason for that has to be 
explained more fully. The question of document authenticity must have existed from the very first beginning. 
In traditional document production, however, copies and defect or corrected specimens can be detected, if 
necessary by scientific analytical methods. Hitler’s alleged diaries may be used as an example 7. Traditional 
documents cannot be altered without visible or microscopic marks being made. It will for instance normally be 
easy for an expert using physical analytical methods to decide which of two signatures that was written first, if 
they are superimposed, to give just one example. In this and many other ways, traditional documents carry 
their own history. 
 
With digital electronic documents it will need new technical knowledge and new conventions for document 
handling to identify and prove which is the original, how original it is, and what its history of coming into 
existence has been. The main problem is that electronic copies are completely identical with the electronic 
original. Amendments, whether they are intended, accidental or fraudulent, can be difficult both to avoid and 
to detect.  How could Hitler’s diaries have been exposed if they had been electronic?  What will keep a 
person from reediting his diaries, memoires, scientific papers etc, given the opportunity? Will not vanity 
triumph over honesty in a number of cases? How much is scientific, technical, commercial, or social 
information  in a given document to be trusted, if nobody is able to guarantee the authenticity of the 
document? Document quality is undeniably related to document authenticity. Somebody has to certify the 
authenticity. With traditional documents, the authenticity could be more or less guaranteed if the physical 
medium that carried the information was preserved. With electronic documents, the task has become a triple 
task: 
• the document carrier still has to be preserved, often by copying and recopying 
• technological obsolescence has to be avoided 
• the document must not be tampered with (document integrity) 
 
The trustworthiness of libraries and archives is at stake 
The Farum story gives a clue to who that guaranteeing entity could be. Two observations that emerge from 
the story should be made in order to reveal them. 
  
It is no news that if it were possible to remake history by making changes in existing documents, or 
contesting their validity, many would have a great interest in doing so. But it may be an overlooked fact that 
this is not a question only about legal documents, like wills.  Libraries and archives have in their possession 
also a number of anonymous and ephemeral documents. Since they are the very stuff that history are made 
of, questions will be raised about their authenticity just as well as for “important” documents.  
 
Further, it is very obvious that the archives - and this will apply to libraries and museums as well - was looked 
upon as an institution that was able to (or at least ought to be able to) give a guarantee that the newspaper 
indeed was genuine and was not tampered with. We that work in such institutions are surrounded by a feeling 
in society that we are trustworthy, that we are societal institutions that are to be relied upon. We want to be 
looked upon as trustworthy institutions. And we deserve it. It is a long tradition with centuries of dedicated 
work, that has earned us that reputation. Such a reputation is not to be treated lightly. Also in the electronic 
era we ought to be able to be relied upon.  
 
But that makes it necessary for us to take up the task and come up with some useful solutions. We must 
master technologies that have been unknown to us earlier. Many things have to be re-engineered, to use a 
cathcphrase which seems to be especially apt here. If we come to think of it, our situation is not much 
different from the one that obtained when the printing press was invented. The solutions at that time were not 
all at hand, but had to be worked out in a long process. The big difference is that in the 15th century, decades 
could be used to solve problems that we nowadays have only years or months to adapt to. 
 
In the words of Peter S. Graham, to which I fully subscribe:  
 
“The Digital Research Collection, both for digital images as the focus of this symposium and for digital 
information generally, must guarantee the longevity and authenticity of information held in trust for present 
and future generations. Establishing a Digital 
Research Collection continues the research library mission. To do so should be considered as natural as 
acquiring the next book or cataloging the next journal. Not to do so would be an abdication of that mission. 
The task calls not so much on new knowledge nor on new techniques, but upon informed commitment: that 
is, upon will. For librarians wondering what is to come of their profession in the electronic age, here is their 
challenge.”8  
 
It can be safely said that this aspect of the digital age in libraries and archives has not been overemphasized. 
It has rather been overlooked. But if we fail to solve the problem, our status as institutions that can guarantee 
the authenticity of documents is at stake9. And who will then pay for the upkeep of such institutions? 
 
So how will we cope with the situation? What are our options? I will mention five possible technical solutions 
that up to now have been explored by different persons or institutions. A technical solution alone is not 
enough. It has to be backed by organizational procedures and financial support. This, however, is outside the 
scope of the present paper.  
 
Five possible technical solutions 
The following five possibilities do not necessarily scan the whole field. They represent ideas that have to a 
lesser or greater extent have been explored by persons interested in the questions raised above, and they 
are the possibilities that one most readily encounter when searches are made. Within the context of this 
paper, I will not endeavour to give a complete technical introduction, but only give some explanatory 
comments and some references for further study of the area. 
 
A. Keeping a log-file 
There is a great urge these days to introduce more Information Technology in hospitals. Estimates show that 
billions of kroner will be used to streamline and modernize the information flow. One of the means will be to 
introduce electronic case records of the patients. In Denmark, only one small hospital has done so as of May 
1998 (Rudkøbing). Sweden, together with the Netherlands, is the European country that so far has done the 
most. In Scania, all ten hospitals have electronic patient case records10. It must be considered vital, in the 
literal sense, that these records are not tampered with. How is that done? 
 
According to the information I have been able to find in Denmark, it is done by keeping a log-file which makes 
a record of who has had access to the record, and introduced which changes.11 It is possible that this is 
viable in a hospital environment, where the number of persons who are to have access is low and under 
control.12 But how can the method possibly be used in the open environment of a research community?  
 
B. Reformatting to secure document media 
Archives around the world receive an increasing number of electronic documents that shall be kept for an 
indefinitely long period of time. One of the possibilities they are exploring is the transfer to other digital media. 
Making a copy on permanent  paper would be technically sound, but economically unfeasible for them 
because of the sheer mass of data. For smaller amounts of data, the paper option is in fact used13.  
 
Because of the threat from technical obsolescence of reading devices, the archives have to plan for a 
remake of the data onto new carriers every five to ten years. That makes a digital solution indispensable. The 
National Archives in Sweden plan to use CD-R (CD-Recordable) and DAT tapes. The National Archives in 
Denmark plan to use two CD-R kept in different places14. CD-R  is a write-once medium (not to be confused 
with a CD Erasable) that should take care of the authenticity problem15. But it is not a practical medium for 
documents that are to be readily accessible. Its main use will be as a back-up medium from which fresh 
copies for ordinary, everyday use can be drawn. That will make a check of document authenticity by making 
comparisons with secure original kept on CD-R a very complicated process. One can easily predict that it will 
not be performed except in very special cases. Normally, researchers will not bother to check anything, and 
when such is the case, many strange things can happen. 
 
A variation of this idea has for several years has been used in the US for commercial electronic documents. 
Independent companies will act as a disinterested third party and for a certain charge keep a copy of the 
contract or other document, to be used as reference in case of dispute. The authority of such a procedure will 
of course be totally dependent on the trustworthiness of the company. It is quite likely that such companies 
will use CD-R (which were not yet invented when these procedures first started) for document medium. 
 
C. Digital watermarking 
Steganograhpy is an old word that suddenly has come into fashion again16. It is related to, but not the same 
as cryptography. Where cryptography is the study and application of principles and techniques by which 
information is rendered unintelligible to all but the intended receiver17, steganography is information hiding in 
a publicly known document in such a way that the hidden information is unknown to or unnoticed by all but 
the intended receiver. The puzzle pictures (fiksérbilleder) from our childhood  provide an example of the idea. 
The word is constructed out of greek steganós, meaning covering, shielding, (water)tight, and gráphein, 
writing. A number of steganographic data programs are available18. The steganographic principle is what is 
used in the recent idea of digital watermarking19. 
 
A digital watermark is composed of a bit pattern distributed throughout the data to be watermark protected. 
The distribution is based on noise theory. If done well, no visual or aural degradation should be noticable, as 
it should be stored in an imperceptible region of the data. The watermark should be more or less 
indestructible, since it is not purely digital, but a digital representation of analog data. Attempts to remove a 
watermark form an image will result in a noticeable degradation in image quality long before the watermark is 
lost.  
 
Until now, digital watermarking has been developed and used mostly for pictures. Embedded in a graphic 
data file, and hidden to the naked eye, it will provide an identification code carrying information about 
copyright protection and data authentication. A typical watermark will contain a copyright notification, a unique 
identification number, a creator identifier, a distributor identifier, a transaction identifier and other data 
attributes. The watermark can be seen with a viewer that normally is freeware. With a special webcrawler 
program, watermark owners can search the net for data files containing their own watermark and possibly 
downloaded and made available without copyright having been achieved. Such things are known to happen. 
So digital watermarking programs are fort the time being well suited to pursue copyright violation on the 
Internet. In the future, audio and video files will probably be protected in that way as well. But will they help in 
the issue of document authenticity as described above? Well, that is an interesting question that should be 
considered carefully, and research into it should be done. 
 
The two last solutions that I will describe, both make use in some way of the idea of a digital signature. Digital 
signatures work by attaching to the document an encoded section containing such data as the author’s name, 
the time of encryption and a checksum based on the contents of the document, an possibly other factors, 
such as the time. The result is that if the document is intercepted or hacked, it cannot be validly altered withot 
invalidating the checksum. 
 
D. Digital time-stamping 
A solution that is expressly invented to meet the challenges listed in this paper has been described by Peter 
S. Graham20. He tells about two researchers from Bellcore, Scott Stornetta and Stuart Haber, who, following 
up on a discussion of a charge of intellectual fraud (against some third person) set out to find a way of 
demonstrating that there had been no tampering with electronic evidence. They wanted a solution that was 
not dependent on hardware, which in due time would be obsolete. Therefore, they opted for an algorithmic 
solution. It has to be easy to use, so that it does not hinder access and use. It must be cheap and long-lived 
(much longer than the lifespan of individuals). The authenticity must be demonstrable, and not only inferred. I 
am not sure whether these criteria were evident from the beginning, but the solution as far as I have seen it 
described (and I know of it only in that second-hand way) they seem to be met. They called their solution 
Digital Time Stamping (DTS).  
 
Digital Time Stamping makes use of a cryptographic technique called one-way hashing, which the document 
in question is subjected to (This does not necessarily mean that the document itself is encrypted, only that a 
hash, a single number with many digits calculated with the help of a hash function from the bit string of the 
document has to be established). It also makes use of a “widely witnessed event”, which draws on the fact 
that what is known to many people outside the circle of interested parties is more difficult to tamper with. DTS 
incorporates this by openly intertwining the hash of a given document with the hashes of other documents 
submitted by unknown other parties. The combined hash for a document obtained this way - the document 
“certificate” - is the result of a visible chain of actions from a number of parties. The purpose of all this is to 
make sure not only that a document is kept in its original state, but also that it existed in that state at a certain 
point in time. A DTS document certificate will thus serve as a documentation of intellectual, financial or legal 
priority.   
 
To use DTS in practice, it is necessary that there somewhere - in a country or a region perhaps - exists a 
time-stamping server. The clients will use some simple software with the hash algorithm on their own PC, 
transmit the hash to the time-stamping server, which then combines the hash with previous hashes. The 
resulting number (the “certificate”) is sent back to the user and may become part of the document 
authentication process when that is needed. How much this idea is now starting to be used in practice in the 
US. In April 1997, Research Libraries Group signed a contract with a Bellcore subsidiary named Surety 
technologies21, headed by Scott Stornetta, to provide electronical data validationservices for digital 
collections. I have never heard of any implementation of it in Europe. But the idea seems to be too good for 
our purposes to be left unexplored. 
 
E. Asymmetrical encryption 
An idea which on the other hand has been put to use in practical work in Scandinavia, is that of employing 
one of the fringe benefits of an encryption program package. The package in question is PGP, short for 
Pretty Good Privacy, a program developed in the US by Phil Zimmerman. It has more or less become the de 
facto standard for encryption within the public domain. Phil Zimmermans work started as a protest against US 
government wanting in principle to have access to electronic communication between individuals. His idea 
was that private persons should be able to protect the privacy in their e-mail messages and file attachments 
by encrypting them, so that only those with a proper authority can decipher the information. Also, the 
messages can be digitally signed, so that it is ensured they have come from the person who allegedly sent 
them, and further that they have not been tampered with in any way while in transit. For private persons, PGP 
is a public domain programme, in full keeping with Zimmermanns point of view. 
 
This is not the place for a discussion of encryption policy, which for the last couple of years has been on the 
agenda in the EU. Nor is it the place for a discussion of the US policy on the possible export of the strong 
encryption algorithm used in PGP, which has brought about the situation that it is illegal to download the 
PGPTM program from a US site (but there are others)22. 
 
At the heart of PGP is the encryption/decryption, carried out with asymmetrical encryption, using the 
combined set of a public key and a private key23. What in the present connection is interesting, is that PGP 
furthermore makes use of digital signatures to provide message authentication. Out of the message a 
“message digest” is made with the help of a strong one-way hash function. This digest can then again be 
encrypted with the sender’s private key, creating a digital signature of the message. PGP is used by 
Linköping University Electronic Press to provide article integrity in their electronic journals24. PGP has been 
released in several versions. The latest general release of the international release is PGP5.0i, for Window 
95 a release 5.5 3i exists. In earlier versions, a well known algorithm called MD5 for message digest creation 
was used. The trouble with MD5 is that in 1997, a German data specialist busted the algorithm, making it 
possible to beat the security of the encrypted signature. For that reason, PGP earned a bad reputation 
amongst those data people for whom security is of the utmost importance. On the other hand, PGP has now, 
in version 5.0 and later, found another and reportedly even more secure way of creating a message digest. In 
any case, PGP must be considered the state-of-the-art for normal, everyday message security. But is that 
enough for libraries and archives that want to guarantee complete security? 
 
If we do not pursue this and the other questions that I have raised, we will never know. We even run the risk 
of being out of business if we do not take these issues very seriously. Is that what we want? 
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reference to other articles. A search for the word in Alta Vista will give thousands of references. 
17
  Encycl. Brit. 15. ed. Vol.3 p. 768 
18
  For more information on steganography, try Neil F. Johnsons homepage, URL 
http://patriot.net/~johnson/Steganography/, with many links to articles and other sites. On the URL 
http://www.heise.de/ct/pgpCA/stego.shtml references to twenty steganographic programs may be found, with 
names like Steganosaurus, Hide and Seek, White Noise Storm and others. Not all of them are truly 
steganographical, not all of them are good, and only two will work on other than picture files.  
19
  Three links to companies selling digital watermarking programs: 
The Dice Company:  http://www.digital-watermark.com/ 
Digimarc Corporation:  http://www.digimarc.com 
Signum Technologies:  http://www.signumtech.com 
20
  op.cit,and also in his Intellectual Preservation: Electronic Preservation of the Third Kind  (Washington DC, 
Commission of Preservation and Access, March 1994) 
21
  For more information, see URL http://www.surety.com. The company licenses a program called Digital 
Notary ™ Record Integrity Service. 
22
  From the URL http://www.pgpi.com you will find all necessary information on the international version of 
PGP. If you want to follow the US side of it  URL http://www.pgp.com, or after the merger of PGP with McAfee 
and other to make Network Associates, http://www.nai.com/default_pgp.asp. 
23
  Asymmetrical encryption, with the use of a private key which is kept secret by the owner, and a public key 
which is made known to all likely recipients of messages sent by the owner of the private key, will not be 
described here. For one of easiest understandable but still technically sound explanations of what it is, see 
the chapter Phil Zimmermann has written in the official PGP User’s Guide, which may be downloaded from 
the URL mentioned above, or in one of the books on PGP, William Stallings: Protect your privacy. A guide for 
PGP users. Prentice Hall PTR 1995. 302 pp. ISBN 0-13-185596-4 
24
  See URL http://www.ida.liu.se/ext/cgi-bin/epa/protect.html  for more information. 
